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CASE COMMENTS
FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION - PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS BY INSURED I1
CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH ON A POLICY HE DOES NOT OWN Is NOT GROUNDS
FOR INCLUSION OF THE DEATH PROCEEDS IN HIs GROSS ESTATE - REVENUE
RULING 67-463 IS UNFOUNDED IN STATUTE OR CASE LAW. - In late May, 1957,
James P. Cleary applied to Aetna Life Insurance Company [Aetna] for two
insurance policies to be issued on his life.' He underwent two physical examina-
tions by Aetna physicians and signed the necessary application forms. Upon re-
ceipt of the applications and medical reports, Aetna issued the two policies and
delivered them to the insured's office on June 20, 1957. The policies were iden-
tical ($50,000 term policies) except for the name of the owner and beneficiary.'
Cass City Manufacturing Company, of which Cleary was an officer and stock-
holder, was designated as the owner and beneficiary of Policy No. 1 954 720.
Cleary's wife, Kathleen M. Gorman (Cleary) [plaintiff], was designated as the
owner and beneficiary of Policy No. 1 954 721. As "owner," plaintiff and Cass
City Manufacturing Company had the sole right to exercise any and all rights of
ownership in their respective policies during the life of the insured. Cass City
Manufacturing Company paid the first (and only) premium on its policy but the
payer of the premium on plaintiff's policy was undetermined.
The insured died on March 25, 1958, less than a year after the policies were
issued. Plaintiff, as executrix of the insured's estate, failed to include a number of
items in the federal estate tax return that she filed for the insured's estate. One of
the items not included was the proceeds from Aetna Policy No. 1 954 721 of
which the plaintiff was owner and beneficiary. The District Director of Internal
Revenue determined that the items should have been included in the gross estate
and issued a deficiency assessment of $9,662.72. Plaintiff paid the extra assess-
ment on September 10, 1962, and then filed a claim for refund of that portion of
the deficiency assessment ($8,098.70) attributable to the death proceeds from
Policy No. 1 954 721. After waiting the required six months, plaintiff filed suit
in a federal district court in Michigan to recover the claimed amount plus in-
terest from September 10, 1962.
Plaintiff moved for summary judgment and, for the purpose of the motion,
the parties assumed that the insured had paid the premium on the policy in ques-
tion. The Government asserted that the procurement of the policy by the insured
and his payment of the only premium constituted a "transfer" in contemplation
of death under section 2035' of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Therefore,
1 This summary of events is taken from the parties' Stipulation of Facts that is appended
to the court's opinion. Gorman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225, 234 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
2 Copies of both policies are appended to the court's opinion. Id. at 237, 246.
3 Section 2035 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides
§ 2035. Transactions in contemplation of death
(a) General rule.-The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time
made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full con-
sideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of
his death.
(b) Application of general rule.-If the decedent within a period of 3 years
ending with the date of his death (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate
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it argued, the total proceeds should, have been included in the insured's gross
estate. The Government's authority for this position was the recently issued
Revenue Ruling 67-463, 4 which states that the portion.of death proceeds which
is attributable to the premiums paid by the insured within three years of his
death is includable in his gross estate under section 2035. In granting plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment the court held: Revenue Ruling 67-463 has no
foundation in either statute or case law, and thus the payment of insurance
premiums in contemplation of death by an insured who has no ownership rights
in the policy does not cause a pro rata amount of the policy proceeds to be in-
cluded in the insured's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. Gorman v.
United States, 288 F.Supp. 225 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
The basic problem in the area of federal estate taxation involves the de-
termination of which property is to be included in a decedent's gross estate and
subjected to the estate tax. Basically, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 pro-
vides that a decedent's gross estate is to include all property in which the de-
cedent had an interest at the time of his death,5 and all property in which the
decedent had an interest that he transferred in contemplation of death.6 Any
transfer made by the decedent within three years of his death is presumed to
have been made in contemplation of death unless proved otherwise.7
The issue in Gorman concerned the application of these estate tax pro-
visions to Aetna Policy No. 1 954 721 issued on the life of the decedent, James
P. Cleary, and owned by plaintiff. The peculiar nature of insurance policies has
produced divergent views over the years as to how they should be treated with re-
gard to estate taxation. Life insurance is different from most other types of property
.in that the ownership of the policy can be-separated from that which keeps the
policy in existence - the payment of the premiums. This was the situation in
Gorman, where the plaintiff was the owner of Policy No. 1 954 721 (she had
control of all the incidents of ownership) 8 but the insured paid the premium.
The arguments and the opinion in Gorman reflect the apparent conflict between
the positions taken by Congress and the Internal Revenue Service [Service] re-
garding the inclusion of the proceeds from life insurance policies in decedents'
gross estates.
In her brief on the motion for summary judgment the plaintiff asserted the
view that life insurance should be treated no differently than any other property
subject to the estate tax. Under section 2035 a decedent has to transfer an
and full consideration in money or money's worth) transferred an interest in property,
relinquished a power, or exercised or released a general power of appointment, such
transfer, relinquishment, exercise, or release shall, unless shown to the contrary; be
deemed to have been made in contemplation of death within the meaning of this
section and sections 2038 and 2041 (relating to revocable'transfers and powers of
appointment); but no such transfer, relinquishment, exercise, or release made before
such 3-year period shall be treated as having been made in contemplation of death.
4 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 327.
5 INT. RaV, CoDa of 1954, § 2033.
6 Id. § 2035(a). This section is quoted in full at note 3 supra.
7 Id. § 2035(b).
8 Stipulation of Facts, % 15, Gorman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225, 236 (E.D.
Mich. 1968). The term "incidents of ownership" includes the power to change the beneficiary,
to surrender or cancel the policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an assignment, to pledge the
policy for a loan, and to obtain from the insurer a loan against the surrender value of the
policy. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (1954).
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interest in some property in contemplation of death in order for the particular
property to be included in his gross estate. The plaintiff argued that there is
no property interest in a life insurance policy until the policy goes into effect.
Once Aetna Policy No. 1 954 721 went into effect, the property interest was
in the plaintiff as owner. Therefore, decedent never had an interest in the policy
which he could have transferred, and the death proceeds from the policy should
not have been included in his gross estate.'
The Government presented a two-pronged argument. Initially, it contended
that the procurement of the policy by the decedent (he filled out the forms,
signed the application, underwent two physicals and paid the first premium)
was a "transfer" of the policy within the meaning of section 2035.1" As an
alternative, the Government took the position that life insurance is different
from other property, particularly when, as in Gorman, the ownership of the policy
and the payment of the premiums are separated. It argued that the payment of the
premium by the decedent was a transfer of an asset under section 2035 - the
asset being the proceeds value of the insurance policy - since the premium
purchased the proceeds."
These arguments were made in the parties' briefs, which were completed
in mid-October, 1967. The interesting factor in the case is that Revenue Ruling
67-463" was not issued until the end of that year. However, when the oral
arguments were made in April, 1968, the application of the Ruling to the situa-
tion in Gorman was acknowledged by both parties and its validity was argued
before the court."
Revenue Ruling 67-463 was addressed to situations in which the insured
transferred ownership in a policy prior to three years before his death but con-
tinued to pay the premiums up until his death. Under these circumstances the
transfer is not in contemplation of death but the premium payments are. The
question as to what amount must be included in the decedent's gross estate in this
situation was answered in the Ruling as follows:
A premium payment under a contract of life insurance by other than
the owner of -the policy is analagous to a gift of specific property by the
donor to the owner. Unlike the unrestricted gift of money, a premium pay-
ment is a gift of insurance protection, a transfer of an interest in the policy
which is transmuted at death into the proceeds of the policy.14
Following this reasoning, the Ruling states that the payment of premiums
within the presumptive contemplation of death period under section 2035 trans-
fers an interest in the policy proceeds measured by the proportion which the
premiums paid in contemplation of death bear to total premiums. Four cases
9 Brief for Plaintiff at 5-6, Gorman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Mich.
1968).
10 Brief for Defendant at 8, Gorman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
11 Id. at 14.
12 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 327.
13 Simmons, District Court Invalidates IRS' Three-Year Premium Payment Rule, 29 J.
TAxATioN 338 (1968).
14 Rav. RUL. 67-463, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 327, 328.
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were cited by the Service in support of this position.' 5 It should be noted that
the holding of the Ruling is quite similar to the alternate argument forwarded
by the Government in its written brief. 6 The application of the Ruling to the
situation in Gorman is based on the payment of the premium by the decedent
in contemplation of death when he had no ownership rights in the policy.
In granting plaintiff's motion the court dealt principally with Revenue
Ruling 67-463. The tone of the court's opinion is set by the following statement:
"This ruling is startling in that it completely ignores the legislative history and
intent relating to the elimination of the premium payment test from the Code.""
The court discussed the history of estate tax treatment of life insurance policies,
and demonstrated that the present position taken by the Service was incorrect
even though it had been accepted in the past. The Internal Revenue Code of
1939"s contained alternative tests for determining whether the proceeds of life
insurance policies were to be included in a decedent's gross estate. An incidents
of ownership or a premium payment test could be applied. 9 Thus, if an insured
transferred the incidents of ownership in a policy in contemplation of death, the
proceeds from the policy would be included in his gross estate.2" Furthermore,
even if the transfer were not in contemplation of death, the proceeds could still
be included if the insured had continued to pay the premiums on the policy."
When the Internal Revenue Code was revised in 1954, Congress indicated
its dislike for the concept that a decedent's gross estate should include the pro-
ceeds from life insurance policies which the decedent neither owned at his death
nor transferred in contemplation of death, simply because he had paid some or
all of the premiums. Under section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
the proceeds of life insurance policies receivable by beneficiaries other than the
estate of the insured -would be included in the insured's gross estate only if the
insured had possessed any of the incidents of ownership in the policy at his death.
With regard to transfers in contemplation of death, the new Code provided
that if the decedent transferred the incidents of ownership in a policy within
three years of his death, the policy proceeds would be included in his gross
estate under section 2035.22 The premium payment test found in the 1939 Codes
was thus apparently eliminated. Congress made this move in order to put
life insurance on an equal footing with other property which is subject to no
15 See text accompanying notes 29-36 infra for a list of these cases and a discussion of the
court's treatment of them.
16 See text accompanying note 11 supra.
17 Gorman v. United States 288 F. Supp. 225, 226 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
18 Ch. 3, § 811(g), 53 Stat. 122, as amended, Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 404, 56
Stat. 944 (1942). For a brief treatment of the earlier history of life insurance policies and
the premium payment test, see Hill, Living With Revenue Ruling 67-463, 107 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 621 (1968).
19 INT. REV. CODE of 1939, ch. 3, § 811(g), 53 Stat. 122, as amended, Revenue Act of
1942, ch. 619, § 404, 56 Stat. 944 (1942).
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 This is set out in the regulations promulgated under section 2042 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1954. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (a) (2) (1954).
23 INT. REv. CODE of 1939, ch. 3, § 811(g), 53 Stat. 122, as amended, Revenue Act of
1942, ch. 619, § 404, 56 Stat. 944 (1942).
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estate tax if the decedent parts with it completely before the contemplation of
death period.2"
Despite this rather definite congressional elimination of the premium pay-
ment test in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the court noted that the Service
has not adhered to the position mandated by the 1954 Code. As soon as the
Code went into effect commentators began to fear that the Service would at-
tempt to continue to include all or part of the death proceeds from a policy in a
decedent's gross estate in situations where the decedent had transferred the policy
three years before his death but had continued to pay the premiums.2" This fear
was justified and the Service succeeded in some situations in unofficially re-
introducing the premium payment test.2 ' Normally, if the insured transferred
the incidents of ownership in a policy more than three years before his death,
it would appear that the policy could not be included in his gross estate under
the incidents of ownership test of section 2042. However, the Service was un-
officially contending that the continued payment of premiums by the insured
up until death constituted a transfer of an asset to the new owner of the policy
under section 2035. The value of the transferred asset was considered to be that
portion of the policy proceeds which was attributable to the premium payments,
rather than merely the total amount of the premium payments themselves."
This was the theory officially promulgated by the Service in Revenue Ruling
67-463.=8
Having noted the conflict of the Service's position (as finally stated formally
in the Ruling) with the congressional intent to remove the premium payment
test in the 1954 Code, the court moved on to attack the foundation underlying
the Ruling. Four cases appear in the text of the Ruling to support the position
taken therein. However, the court felt that these cases were distinguishable and
failed to sanction the conclusion of the Ruling permitting the use of a premium
payment test. Chase National Bank v. United States,' decided in 1929, involved
the constitutionality of the federal estate tax on life insurance policies. In dis-
tinguishing this case the court noted that it made no mention of the relationship
of premium payments to policy proceeds, the main point of the Ruling. Lehman
v. Commissioner0 was another case arising prior to the enactment of the 1954
Code, and it did not involve insurance policies. On this basis the court felt that
it was "seemingly without connection to the substance of the Ruling."' Scott
v. Commissioner"2 did involve a situation somewhat similar to the Ruling. The
question in Scott concerned the degree to which a policy was owned by the in-
24 S. Ras. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1954); H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. A316, A317 (1954).
25 Dicus, Some Implications of the 1954 Code for Estate Planning, 32 TAXES 938, 941(1954); Schlesinger, Gifts of Life Insurance, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 813 (1964).
26 Brown and Sherman, Transfers in Contemplation of Death, 101 TRuSTS & ESTATES
790 (1962); Simmons, Contemplation of Death and the New Premium Payment Tist, 53
A.B.A.J. 475 (1967).
27 Simmons, supra note 26.
28 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 327.
29 278 U.S. 327 (1929).
30 109 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940).
31 Gorman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225, 229 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
32 374 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1967).
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sured at his death, and the Ninth Circuit concluded that the degree of ownership
was to be determined by the premiums the insured had paid. The court in
Gorman distinguished this case on the grounds that it involved the application
of California law which, unlike section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, determined ownership of life insurance policies by means of the premium
payment test." The cited case which best supported the position of the Ruling
was Liebmann v. Hassett3 4 There the insured transferred a policy to his wife
in contemplation of death and she paid the last two premiums on it prior to his
death. It was held that the total proceeds less an amount proportionate to the
premiums paid by the wife were includable in the insured's gross estate. Since
payment of the premium by someone other than the insured in Liebmann kept
a pro rata amount of the policy proceeds out of the insured's gross estate, the
Service reasoned in Revenue Ruling 67-463 that a similar premium payment
by the insured should make a pro rata amount of the policy proceeds includable
in his gross estate. The Gorman court rejected this contention on the ground that
Liebmann had been decided under section 30 2 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1926,"5
which had made life insurance includable in an insured's gross estate to the
extent that it was "taken out" by the insured. The amount "taken out" was
that portion of the proceeds equal to the ratio of premiums paid by the insured
to total premiums." At the time Liebmann was decided the law provided for a
premium payment test, but since this test was rejected in the 1954 Code the
court felt the case was not support for the Ruling.
The court continued its criticism of the Service's reliance on the premium
payment by attacking the theory behind the Ruling, and the rationale of the
premium payment test in general. In its written brief in Gorman, the Govern-
ment had argued that the payment of the premium by the insured in contempla-
tion of death was a purchase of an asset for the plaintiff as owner of the policy,
this asset being Aetna's promise to pay her $50,000 on the death of the insured.
Since the asset transferred was the promise to pay the $50,000, that amount
should be included in the gross estate." The court considered this rationale
fallacious in that it ignored the real nature of the insurance policy. Life insurance
is essentially a contract between the owner of the policy and the issuing company.
Once the policy goes into effect the owner has a contractual right, conditioned on
the insured's death, to receive the proceeds, and this right is not transferred as
each premium is paid. Since the plaintiff in Gorman owned the policy from the
beginning, she had the contractual right to the proceeds. The Government's con-
33 Gorman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225, 230 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
34 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945).
35 Ch. 27, § 302(g), 44 Stat. 71 (1926).
36 T.D. 5032, 1949-1 Cum. BULL. 427, 428.
37 Brief for Defendant at 15, Gorman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Mich.
1968). A minority of the House Ways and Means Committee expressed feelings similar to
those of the Service on life insurance policies when the 1954 Code was enacted:
But life insurance is not like other property. It is inherently testamentary in nature.
It is designed, in effect, to serve as a will, regardless of its investment features.
Where the insured has paid the premiums on life insurance for the purpose of
adding to what he leaves behind at his death for his beneficiaries, the insurance
proceeds should certainly be included in his taxable estate. H.R. RaP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. B14 (1954).
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tention that this right was transferred to her by the insured's payment of the
premium was deemed invalid."
The position taken in the Ruling is also inconsistent with the gift tax treat-
ment of life insurance policies. The court noted that the regulations promulgated
under section 2511 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (a gift tax section)
provide that when a premium is paid on a policy by someone other than the
owner, it is the dollar amount of the premium that is considered transferred from
the payer to the owner for gift tax purposes."s
The Gorman court failed to mention another district court case that is con-
tradictory to the Service's position. In Lamade v. Brownell4 a fact situation
arose that was similar to the one which occasioned Revenue Ruling 67-463. An
insured paid two premiums in contemplation of death on a policy which he had
earlier transferred to his wife. The federal district court in Pennsylvania held
that the policy proceeds were not includable in the insured's gross estate since
the premium payment by the insured was only a gift of the premium amount
to the owner.4 This case appears to be a direct rebuttal of the Service position
that the payment of the premium is a transfer of the death proceeds of the policy.
In concluding its remarks on Revenue Ruling 67-463, the Gorman court
reiterated that no reliance could be placed on the Ruling in view of its conflict
with the 1954 Code provisions, the lack of support for it in the case law, and
its inconsistency with the gift tax regulations. In the court's words:
Payment of premium test being specifically deleted may not be in-
corporated through administrative tactics. This court will not legislate, nor
shall the service, in an area specifically reserved to Congress. The fact that
a tax break in estate planning may arise from the deletion of the premium
payment test is no reason to argue that the benefit should not inure to the
taxpayer. 2
The discussion and conclusion of the court make it clear that the Service's
use of the premium payment test will not be tolerated. In fact, nearly all of the
court's opinion was a direct attack on this test, as embodied in Revenue Ruling
67-463. However, by focusing specifically on this aspect of the case, the court
passed over the original argument made in the parties' briefs.
In the first part of its written argument, the Government had contended
that the acts performed by the insured in procuring the policy for the plaintiff
amounted to a transfer of the policy within the scope of section 2035, so as to
make the proceeds of the policy subject to the estate tax.4" The emphasis here
was not on the premium payment test. In essence, the Government was claim-
38 Gorman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225, 233 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
39 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h) (8) reads in pertinent part:
(8) If the insured purchases a life insurance policy, or pays a premium on a
previously issued policy, the proceeds of which are payable to a beneficiary or bene-
ficiaries other than his estate, and with respect to which the insured retains no
[incidents of ownership] the insured has made a gift of the value of the policy,
or to the extent of the premium paid .... (Emphasis added.)
40 245 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Pa. 1965).
41 Id. at 697.
42 Gorman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225, 230 (E.D. Mich. 1968).




ing that but for the acts of the insured (forms, applications, physicals, etc.), the
plaintiff would never have owned the policy. Therefore, those acts amounted
to a transfer of the policy. The plaintiff's original contention was the same one
she used throughout the proceedings. A reading of section 2035 indicates that
an insured's gross estate only includes that property in which the insured had an
interest that he transferred in contemplation of 'death. Since the insured never
had any interest in the policy (plaintiff was the sole owner'when it went into
effect), he could not have transferred an interest within the meaning of section
2035.1' This argument was somewhat reinforced by the fact that the District
Director of Internal Revenue in Michigan never attempted to have the pro-
ceeds from the policy issued to Cass City Manufacturing Company included in
the insured's gross estate. The insured took the same steps with regard to "pro-
curing" that policy as he did for plaintiff's policy. Despite the fact that the
court limited its discussion primarily to the Ruling and the premium payment
test, it can be inferred that by granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judg-
ment, the court felt that the insured's acts did not amount to a transfer under
section 2035. However, as one commentator suggests, 5 a specific holding on the
point might have been better since the issue could easily arise again in the future.
This is especially so in view of the fact that most life insurance purchasers will
probably take the same steps that Cleary did in Gorman (place ownership in the
beneficiary) if they want to avoid the estate tax completely. In view of the
strong arguments against Revenue Ruling 67-463 and the premium payment
test, the "procurement" argument is probably the only'one that the Service could
use to get unowned policies into an insured's gross estate. It may well be the
Government's argument when Gorman goes to the court of appeals.46 Neverthe-
less, for the present, Gorman stands out as a strong reassertion of the congres-
sional elimination of the premium payment test as a ground for including life
insurance policy proceeds in an insured's gross estate for estate tax purposes.
John G. Bambrick, Jr.
NEGLIGENCE - EMOTIONAL DISTRESS - CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
ALLOWS MOTHER, NOT IN PHYSICAL DANGER, TO RECOVER -FOR EMOTIONAL
SHOCK, WITH RESULTING PHYSICAL CONSEQUENCES, SUFFERED WHEN SHE
WITNESSED THE DEATH OF HER CHILD CAUSED BY NEGLIGENT MOTORIST.-
On September 27, 1964, Margery Dillon's infant daughter was killed while
crossing a street, through the negligence of the defendant motorist. Another of
Mrs. Dilon's infant daughters and Mrs. Dillon herself were in close proximity
to the accident. Besides seeking recovery for the wrongful death of the one infant,
both the mother and surviving sister sought damages for emotional disturbance
which they suffered from witnessing the accident. The defendant motorist
44 Brief for Plaintiff at 5-6, Gorman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
45 Simmons, supra note 13, at 340.
46 Letter from Nathan B. Driggers, counsel for the plaintiff in Gorman, to John G. Bam-
brick, November 25, 1968, on file with the Notre Dame Lawyer.
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moved for a summary judgment, contending that neither the mother nor the
sister was within the zone of physical danger. The trial court sustained the
motion as to the mother's cause of action because she was admittedly not within
the zone, but denied it as to the sister's because of the possibility that she had
been close enough to the accident to suffer physical injuries of her own. On an
appeal by the mother the California Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of
her cause of action and, with three justices dissenting, held: a mother is allowed
recovery for emotional disturbance, resulting in physical injuries, suffered from
witnessing the negligent infliction of death or injury to her child even though she
was in no physical danger herself. Dillon v. Legg, - Cal. 2d -, 441 P.2d 912,
69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
Recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress has never found great
favor with the courts. Although the courts have spoken in terms of "lack of fore-
seeability" and "absence of duty" when denying recovery in emotional distress
cases, the usual policy considerations advanced to limit recovery have been
summed up by the Wisconsin Supreme Court as follows:
Such consequences are so unusual and extraordinary, viewed after the
event, that a user of the highway may be said not to subject others
to an unreasonable risk of them by the careless management of his vehicle.
Furthermore, the liability imposed is wholly out of proportion to the culpa-
bility of the negligent tort-feasor, would put an unreasonable burden upon
users of the highway, open the way to fraudulent claims and enter a field
that has no sensible or just stopping point.:
While most jurisdictions now allow recovery for emotional distress in at least
some situations,2 various restrictions have been judicially evolved3 so as to over-
come the thrust of the above objections. Thus, in order to lessen the likelihood
of fraud, the almost universal rule is that the emotional distress must result in
some visible, physical harm.4 Also, both in England5 and the United States,6
the courts initially applied the "impact" rule to establish another guarantee that
the mental disturbance was genuine. This rule allows recovery only if the
defendant's negligence has resulted in some physical impact with the plaintiff.'
The impact rule is now on the decline in most jurisdictions' and is being replaced
by the "zone of danger" rule, which allows recovery for emotional distress
suffered by the plaintiff through fear for his own safety if he was in an area of
1 Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 613, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935).
2 W. PROSSER, LAw oF TORTS 349-50 (3d. ed. 1964).
3 For a detailed history of this evolution, see Goodhart, The Shock Cases and Area of
Risk, 16 MoD. L. REv. 14 (1953); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law
of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REv. 1033 (1936); Smith, Relations of Emotions to Injury and Disease:
Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193 (1944); Throckmorton, Damages for
Fright, 34 HAv. L. REv. 260 (1921).
4 W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 348-49.
5 Victorian Ry. Comm'r v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (1888).
6 Lehman v. Brooklyn City R.R., 47 Hun 355 (N.Y. 1888).
7 This impact need not result in physical harm to the plaintiff, and the slightest contact
with the person of the plaintiff seems to satisfy this requirement. W. PROSSER, supra note 2,
at 350-51.
8 Id. at 351-52. However, some states continue to rigidly adhere to the impact rule. For
example, Pennsylvania as late as 1966, in Knaub v. Gotwalt, 442 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646
(1966), reaffirmed the impact rule.
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exposure to possible physical harm as a result of the defendant's negligence.'
A variation of this rule is evidenced in a decision allowing recovery based on
fear for the safety of another, as long as the plaintiff was himself within the zone
of danger.'"
There was disagreement between the majority and the dissent in the
instant case as to whether California had previously followed the zone of danger
rule or this variation." However, regardless of what the old position in Cali-
fornia might have been, the majority's holding in Dillon dearly extended the
limit of liability for emotional distress beyond any previous American rule. 2
Having no American precedents to rely on, the majority faced a difficult task
in reaching its conclusion. This was especially true in view of the fact that the
California Supreme Court, as late as 1963, had denied recovery in a case on
all fours with the Dillon fact situation.' The majority in Dillon succeeded in
overruling this precedent by first illustrating the artificiality of the zone of
danger rule, and then demonstrating that some of the objections given to limit
expansion of the rule could be overcome or were not applicable.
The majority initially reasoned that the zone of danger rule was illogical
because of the fact that in the instant situation the sister could recover for
emotional distress caused by her fear for the safety of another, but the mother
could not although she experienced the same fear, solely because of their relative
position.' However, the majority's assumption that the sister could recover for
this type of injury might not have been valid. It is true that she could have
recovered for mental distress caused by fear for her own safety, but, as the
dissent points out, it was not clear that one inside the zone could recover for
shock as a result of fear for another.'5 If in fact the sister would not have been
allowed recovery for the distress caused by fear for her sister, then the "hopeless
artificiality" of the zone of danger rule is not quite so evident.
The majority also made a point of specifically examining two of the objec-
tions that have often been raised in the past to limit the liability for emotional
distress. These objections are 1) fear of fraudulent claims and 2) fear of un-
definable limits of liability. In attempting to refute the first charge, the majority
asserted that, considering the circumstances, the possibility of fraudulent claims
in this type of case is rather slim: "[W]e certainly cannot doubt that a mother
who sees her child killed will suffer physical injury from shock." 6 Although
this is a valid assumption, the majority has not limited its holding to the specific
fact pattern at issue in Dillon.17 Whether the certainty of physical injury from
9 E.g., Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
10 Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933).
11 Dillon v. Legg, - Cal.2d -, 441 P.2d 912, 927 n.4, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 87 n.4 (1968).
12 Spearman v. McCary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912). had allowed a mother to
recover for emotional distress suffered when the horses pulling the wagon from which she had
just alighted but which still contained her children were frightened by the negligence of the
defendant. However the court in that case focused on overcoming the impact rule, and the
exact question that was to be presented in Dillon years later never came up. It is uncertain
whether the mother in Spearman was fearful for her own safety.
13 Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal.2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr.
33 (1963).
14 Dillon v. Legg, - Cal.2d - 441 P.2d 912, 915-16, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 75-76 (1968).
15 Id. at--, 441 P.2d at 927 n.4, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 87 n.4.
16 Id. at-, 441 P.2d at 917, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
17 Id. at -, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
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shock will be present in all other cases which this new rule will cover is, of
course, more debatable. The second reason given by the majority for rejection
of the "fraudulent claims" objection seems to be more substantial. It asserts that
the danger of fraudulent recovery in some cases "does not justify the wholesale
rejection of the entire class of claims in which that potentiality arises."'" Also, it
makes reference to various other classes of cases in which this same danger
exists but where the courts have nevertheless entertained the action. 9 In fact,
the fraudulent claims objection has been used repeatedly in many situations
where recovery has been denied, but in the final analysis the possibility of fraud
appears in all cases, and it is ultimately the job of the courts and juries to
ascertain the legitimacy of claims by the substantiality of proof.
The second objection attacked by the majority seems to be more funda-
mental, and permeates the whole negligence area of tort law. The danger of
unlimited liability has traditionally been restricted by the imposition of a fore-
seeability test. After a discussion of the foreseeability concept, the majority con-
cluded that emotional distress could be a foreseeable injury in some situations.
The majority then proceeded to set down guidelines to aid in determining when
this type of injury could be considered reasonably foreseeable. The following
factors were enunciated:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as con-
trasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the
shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the
sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with
learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether
plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence
of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship.20
However, it is important to note that the majority did not limit recovery to only
those cases where all these factors are present. Apparently, then, emotional
distress can be reasonably foreseeable although one, or perhaps even more, of the
factors are absent.2 ' The majority is thus willing to allow the limits of liability
to be defined in future cases. This confidence in the ability of courts to define
these limits is based on the observation that in. analogous situations the courts
have been competent in drawing the limits of liability.22
The majority relied heavily on the development of the English cases dealing
with the negligent infliction of emotional distress to illustrate its point. As early
as 1925, in Hambrook v. Stokes Brothers,"2 the English court granted recovery
for injury suffered by a mother as ,a result of her fear for the safety of her
children. In that case, the plaintiff had suffered a miscarriage and died as a
result of the shock received when she heard a runaway lorry crash in the area
18 Id. at-, 441 P.2d at 917-18, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78.
19 Id. at -, 441 P.2d at 918-19, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78-79.
20 Id. at--, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
21 Id. at-, 441 P. 2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
22 The majority felt that the ability of the courts to limit liability had been demonstrated
in the area of the "open car" cases, cases involving negligent drafting of a legal instrument,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the English treatment of the instant problem.
Id. at -, 441 P.2d at 221-24, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81-84.
23 [19251 1 K.B. 141.
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where she had just left her two children. Whether the mother herself was in
danger is a divided question,24 but the court in Dillon took the position that she
was not. 5 By then showing the development of the English law from the
Hambrook case, the majority attempted to demonstrate that courts are able to
establish viable guidelines so that the danger of infinite liability can be avoided.
The dissent by Justice Burke contains a three-pronged assault upon the
majority's reasoning. First, the dissenters do not indulge in the confidence that
the guidelines set forth by the majority will provide any rational limit to this
new type of liability. They feel that the guidelines leave many questions un-
answered. For example, what if there is an honest mistake that the third party
is in danger or injured when in truth he is not? How close must the relationship
be? How near must the plaintiff be to the scene of the accident?2 While it is
true that some of these questions are left unanswered by the majority, it must
be remembered that many rules of law, especially in the tort area, evolve slowly,
and it is seldom that one case is able to provide the answers to all the situations
which may arise. It is only through the resolution of a number of cases that
any rule of law begins to assume a definable shape.
The dissent also finds fault with the majority's assertion that the prior rule
was incongruous. As stated above, the dissenters concluded that California
decisions had never allowed a recovery based on the plaintiff's fear for another,
even when the plaintiff was himself in the zone of danger.2" Allowing a person
recovery when he has been placed in danger of actual physical impact is one
thing, the dissenting opinion asserts, but
[i]t is quite another thing to say that those who are out of the field of physical
danger through impact shall have a legally protected right to be free from
emotional distress occasioned by the peril of others, when that distress
results in physical impairment.2
The third criticism by the dissenters centers on the majority's failure to
overcome all the objections which have been put forth in rejection of this type
of liability. Relying upon the reasons given in Waube v. Warrington," Justice
Burke concluded that the objections of liability out of proportion to culpability
and unreasonable burden upon the users of the highway were valid, and should
have been answered before any extension of liability. The dissent reasoned that
extending the liability of motorists in this manner represents an injustice to them
and that the "answer must be reached by balancing the social interests involved
in order to ascertain how far defendant's duty and plaintiff's right may justly
and expediently be extended.""0 However, this fear that the liability would be
24 Compare Goodhart, supra note 3, at 18-19 and Smith, supra note 3, at 237 with
Magruder, supra note 3, at 1038.
25 Dillon v. Legg, - Cal.2d -, 441 P.2d 912, 923, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 83 (1968).
26 Id. at-, 441 P.2d at 926, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
27 Id. at -, 441 P.2d at 927 n.4, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 86; see note 15, supra, and accom-
panying text.
28 Id. at -, 441 P.2d at 927, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 87, quoting from Waube v. Warrington,
.216 Wis. 603, 612-13, 258 N.W. 497, 500-01 (1935).
29 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935); see text and quote accompanying note 1, supra.
30 Dillon v. Legg, - Cal.2d -, 441 P.2d 912-927, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72, 87 (1968),
quoting from Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 613, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935).
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out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tortfeasor fails to take into
account the fact that a tortfeasor's liability is often not in proportion to his degree
of negligence. In actual fact, the quantitative extent of liability usually depends
upon the characteristics of the victim."' Thus the liability of a defendant who
kills a young, promising executive with a wife and five children will be much
greater than that of a defendant who, with the same degree of negligence, kills
an eighty year old derelict.
The dissent also expressed concern with the problem of contributory
negligence. The majority had stated that any contributory negligence on the
part of the deceased child would defeat recovery by the mother. 2 The dissent
takes exception to this assertion: "The familiar and heretofore unquestioned
principle is that the relationships of parent and child or of husband and wife
in themselves furnish no basis for imputation of contributory negligence.""3
The majority's acceptance of contributory negligence of the child as a complete
bar to recovery can therefore mean either of two things: that this "unquestioned
principle" has been abrogated as the dissent fears, or that in the instant situation
there will be an exception. It is suggested that the latter alternative is more
likely since the majority gives no justification for a ruling that would extend
"far beyond the confines of the particular issue before us." 4 Thus, even though
the majority speaks of a breach of duty toward the bystanders, it seems to be un-
willing to permit this action to stand on its own, but will only allow recovery on
a sort of parasitic basis. The majority's apparent reluctance to allow the
mother's recovery to stand on its own merit may provide an insight into the man-
ner in which this court will solve some of the problems feared by the dissenters.
If the court will insist that primary liability be established first, then it appears
that if the child has assumed the risk of injury there would be no primary
liability, and hence no liability to the witness. Again, if the child were in no
danger but the plaintiff was honestly mistaken that he was in danger, there
would be no liability to the plaintiff because, again, primary liability to the child
is lacking. Carrying this reasoning further, it could be argued that if the child
were placed in danger, but was not aware of his peril or suffered no emotional
distress and no physical injury, then even if the plaintiff suffered emotional
distress from witnessing the danger there would still be no primary liability to
the child to which the plaintiff's action could be attached.
It may be possible to ascertain the answers to some of the other questions
that the dissent considered inadequately treated by an examination of the English
cases referred to by the Dillon court. First, it would seem that the onlooker would
not necessarily have to be a female nor would that party's observation of the
accident be necessary. This was the case in Boardman v. Sanderson,5 where
the English court allowed a father to recover for mental shock suffered when he
heard the screams of his son, whose foot had been caught under the defendant's
car. However, it seems that the court will require some relationship between the
31 Tort Symposium, 19 Oiu . L. REv. 307, 340 (1966).
32 Dillon v. Legg, - Cal.2d -, 441 P.2d 912, 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76 (1968).
33 Id. at -, 441 P.2d at 928, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
34 Id.
35 [1964] 1 W.L.R. 1317 (C.A.).
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plaintiff and the third party, since reference is made by the majority to Bourhill
(Hay) v. Young as being an example of the sort of case that would not be
included in the scope of liability. There the court denied recovery to a casual
bystander who suffered shock from witnessing an accident.
While it is true that the fear of an unreasonable burden on the users of the
highway is legitimate, this danger would probably present itself only if the courts
relax the degree to which the requirements expressed in the majority's guidelines
must be met. Allowing casual bystanders or even close relatives not present to
recover would certainly substantiate the fear of unreasonable burden, but an
intelligent use of the guidelines will keep liability within reasonable limits.
The majority believed that its decision had been reached by using the
general principles of tort law." However, the guidelines used to resolve the issue
have been characterized as illogical and arbitrary by no less an authority than
Dean Prosser, who originally enunciated them." Nevertheless, even admitting
this arbitrariness, the decision must be applauded. Whether the courts will be
able to cope with the situation using the guidelines provided remains to be seen,
but in rendering its decision the Dillon majority did not succumb to what has
been termed the "wedge" argument:
The Principle of the Wedge is that you should not act justly now for fear
of raising expectations that you may act still more justly in the future-
expectations which you are afraid you will not have the courage to satisfy. 9
Because of the esteem enjoyed by the California Supreme Court and its
leadership in other areas of the law,4" the Dillon case takes on added importance
throughout the country. Other courts are bound to watch the California develop-
ment in this area; if none of the fears of the dissent are realized, the zone of
danger rule appears destined for nationwide collapse.
Paul E. Pollock
FEDERAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION - APPOINTMENT OF AN OUT-OF-STATE
FIDUCIARY FOR THE PURPOSE OF CREATING DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IS COL-
LUSIVE AND PROHIBITED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1359.-On November 27, 1966, Richard
R. Riegner, a minor, was injured when the automobile in which he was a
passenger collided with a vehicle operated by one Russell Millard. The accident
occurred in Berks County, Pennsylvania, where Riegner lived with his mother,
Martha M. Fritzinger. In January, 1967, Riegner, with the consent of his
mother, petitioned the Orphans' Court of Berks County to appoint a guardian
for his estate for the purpose of pursuing his tort action. On February 6, 1967
the Orphans' Court appointed Stella McSparran, a New Jersey citizen, as
Riegner's guardian. This appointment created diversity of citizenship since all
36 [1943] A.C. 92.
37 Dillon v. Legg, - CaI.2d -, 441 P.2d 912, 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 84 (1968).
38 W. PRossER, supra note 2, at 354.
39 Goodhart, supra note 3, at 14.
40 See, e.g., Greennun v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963) (products liability).
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parties to the accident were Pennsylvania citizens.' Several weeks later Stella
McSparran instituted a suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania to recover damages incurred as a result of the accident.
Riegner's mother joined in the suit in her own right seeking out-of-pocket
medical expenses.
Chief Judge Clary of the district court dismissed the action for lack of
jurisdiction, holding that a parent who lacks diversity may not join "as a matter
of right" in the created diversity suit of his minor child.2 However, this issue of
pendent jurisdiction was never reached on appeal. Instead, the Third Circuit
focused on the question of whether the primary claim between the defendant
and the out-of-state guardian was in itself sufficient to satisfy diversity jurisdic-
tion. Reargued before the court en banc with Esposito v. Emery, another per-
sonal injury action where an out-of-state guardian was appointed to create
diversity, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, with three
judges dissenting, overruled Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc.4 and Jaffe v. Phila-
delphia & Western Railroad Co.' and held: the appointment of an out-of-state
fiduciary in order to create diversity jurisdiction is collusive and thereby violative
of section 1359, title 28 of the United States Code. McSparran v. Weist, 402
F.2d 867 (3rd Cir. 1968).
After noting that the present controversy was not whether the infant or
fiduciary's citizenship was to be controlling,' the court articulated as its funda-
mental problem "the effect of the artificial creation or manufacture of diversity
[jurisdiction]."17 The statute upon which the court relied in determining this
issue was section 1359 of the Judicial Code.8 Section 1359 is a combination,
in simplified form, of the old anti-assignment statute? and section 37 of the
Judicial Code of 1911."0 The anti-assignment statute provided that in diversity
suits brought by assignees, the citizenship of both the assignor and assignee had
to be diverse from that of the defendant.' Section 37 of the Judicial Code com-
manded the dismissal or remand of an original or removed action when
such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy
properly within the jurisdiction of said district court, or that the parties
1 McSparran v. Weist, 270 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Pa. 1967), rev'd, 402 F.2d 867 (3rd Cir.
1968).
2 Id.
3 402 F.2d 878 (3rd Cir. 1968).
4 264 F.2d 784 (3rd Cir. 1959).
5 180 F.2d 1010 (3rd Cir. 1950).
6 McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 871 (3rd Cir. 1968). It is well established that
the citizenship of the fiduciary rather than the beneficiary is controlling in the determination
of diversity of citizenship. See generally Childress v. Emory, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 642 (1823);
Rice v. Houston, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 66 (1871) (executors and administrators); Coal Com-
pany v. Blatchford, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 172 (1870) (trustees); Mexican Central Ry. v.
Eckman, 187 U.S. 429 (1903) (general guardians).
7 McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 871 (3rd Cir. 1968).
8 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964) provides: "A district court shall not have jurisdiction of
a civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusive-
ly made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court."
9 Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24(1), 36 Stat. 1091 (formerly codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 41(1) (1940)).
10 Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 472 (formerly codified at 28 U.S.C. § 80(1940)).
11 3A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 17.05, at 151 (2d ed. 1968).
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to -said suit have been improperly or collusively joined, either as plaintiffs
or defendants, for the purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable. 2
The Reviser's Notes indicate two primary purposes for condensing the above
sections.'" First, as noted by the court in McSparran,
Provisions . . . for dismissal of an action not really and substantially in-
volving a dispute or controversy within the jurisdiction of a district court
were omitted as unnecessary [because] any court will dismiss a case not
within its jurisdiction when its attention is drawn to the fact, or even on
its own motion 4
Second, the condensed section 1359 eliminates confusing and unnecessary ex-
ceptions to the assignee clause and eliminates the effect of that clause on bona
fide assignees. 5 As explained by the Fifth Circuit in Caribbean Mills, Inc. v.
Kramer:6
Under the original clause, a bona fide assignee could not sue in federal
court unless his assignor could have; under section 1359, any assignee can
sue in federal court so long as he was not improperly or collusively made a
party in order to invoke federal jurisdiction.17
"Improperly or collusively made a party in order to invoke federal jurisdic-
tion" are the key words in interpreting section 1359. Since section 80 of the
1940 Judicial Code' contained similar words, the cases under that section have
laid the foundation for assessing whether an assignment or other device was
"improperly or collusively made." One familiar rule developed under section 80,
and relating to the incorporation of an entity in a particular state, was that if
the corporate transfer was merely a sham, the device would not confer diversity
jurisdiction on the federal courts. However, if the incorporation were actual-
not feigned or merely colorable-the motives would not be inquired into and
diversity jurisdiction would be sustained. The Supreme Court decisions of Lehigh
Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. Kelly' 9 and Black and White Taxicab and
Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co.2" best illustrate
this point. In Lehigh Mining, a Virginia corporation organized a separate cor-
poration in the state of Pennsylvania in order to bring suit in federal court
against a Virginia citizen. In examining the issue, Justice Harlan stated for the
Court:
The arrangement by which, without any valuable consideration, the
stockholders of the Virginia corporation organized a Pennsylvania corpora-
tion and conveyed these lands to the new corporation for the express pur-
'12 Id.
13 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964), Reviser's Note, at 5973.
14 Id. at 5974, cited in McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 873 (3rd Cir. 1968).
15 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964), Reviser's Note, at 5974.
16 392 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1968).
17 Id. at 389.
18 Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 37, 36 Stat. 1098.
19 160 U.S. 327 (1895).
20 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
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pose-no other purpose is stated or suggested--of creating a case for the
federal court, must be regarded as a mere device to give jurisdiction . . .
and as being, in law, a fraud . ... Such a device cannot receive our
sanction.21
The thrust of Justice Harlan's rejection of the Virginia corporation transfer is
rooted in his acknowledgement that there still exists "the right and power" of the
grantor to compel the Pennsylvania corporation to convey the legal title of its
lands to the grantor without any valuable consideration.2 However, in Black
and White Taxicab, a Tennessee corporation was organized to succeed a
Kenticky corporation for the purpose of creating diversity of citizenship. In this
case no violation of section 80 was found, since the Kentucky corporation com-
pletely liquidated its business. The Court concluded:
The motives which induced the creation of respondent to become suc-
cessor to its Kentucky grantor and take a transfer of its property have no
influence on the validity of the transactions which are the subject of the
suit. The succession and transfer were actual, not feigned or merely color-
able . . . It is enough that respondent is the real party in interest.2
'(Emphasis added.)
Thus, regardless of motive, collusion was interpreted under section 80 in terms
of actual control and power.
The Third Circuit utilized this same rationale in cases in which diversity was
created by the appointment of an out-of-state fiduciary. For example, in Corabi
v. Auto Racing, Inc.,2  the mother of a deceased minor resigned as administratrix
of the estate to permit the appointment of a nonresident so that suit could be
brought in federal court. In a unanimous opinion by Chief Judge Biggs, the
court, relying strongly on Black and White Taxicab, held that the nonresident
administrator had capacity to sue, and that his citizenship, and not that of the
decedent or the beneficiaries, was determinative of diversity for purposes of
federal jurisdiction.2 5 Despite the obvious intent of appointing an out-of-state
administrator solely to create diversity, the Corabi court found
21 Lehigh Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 339 (1895).
22 Id. at 337.
23 Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 524 (1928).
24 264 F.2d (3rd Cir. 1959). Prior to the Corabi decision the Third Circuit had encoun-
tered the manufactured diversity problem in Jaffe v. Philadelphia & Western R.R., 180 F.2d
1010 (3rd Cir. 1950). In Jaffe, decedent was killed by defendant's high-speed trolley car in
the state of Pennsylvania. The decedent, the widow and her children, and the defendant were
all citizens of Pennsylvania. An action under the Pennsylvania wrongful death statute and the
Pennsylvania survival law, brought by the administratrix ad prosequendum who was a New
Jersey citizen and a stenographer for the widow's attorney, was sustained. The Third Circuit
held that the diversity requirement for federal jurisdiction was satisfied despite the admission
that the appointment of the out-of-state representative was made primarily because plaintiff's
counsel desired to bring the action in the federal court. In so holding, the court relied princi-
pally on dicta from Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183 (1931), in which the
Supreme Court upheld the destruction of diversity through the appointment of an adminis-
trator who was a citizen of defendant's state. The faulty and insufficient reasoning of jaffe
is examined in Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 873, 874 n.l1 (1964).
25 264 F.2d 784, 786 (1959).
[April 1969]
CASE COMMENTS
that § 1359 did not bar the action, because there was involved no collusion
between plaintiff and defendant in fraud of the court, and the action was
not improperly brought since there was no impropriety or irregularity in-
volved in the perfectly valid proceeding in the state court for the appoint-
ment of an out-of-state fiduciary.
26
Corabi has been followed by other courts on this question of "manufactured"
diversity jurisdiction2
Since 1959, the year of the Corabi decision, several new factors have arisen
which persuaded the Third Circuit to overturn its own precedent 28 One of these
factors was the American Law Institute's [ALl] study of the diversity cases filed
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania during 1958 and 1959.29 This detailed
study revealed that slightly over twenty percent of all diversity cases were brought
by out-of-state personal representatives of Pennsylvania citizens against Penn-
sylvania defendants. 0 Such statistics clearly demonstrate that the interpretation
of section 1359 expressed in Corabi has resulted in an expansion of federal
diversity jurisdiction. This result is contrary to the judicial attitude espoused in
the federal question area, where the predominant tendency has been to restrict
the scope of federal jurisdiction.3
The McSparran court was also strongly influenced by the newly proposed
amendments to the Judicial Code,32 which are themselves largely a result of the
ALI's careful study of diversity jurisdiction. Under proposed section 1301(b)
(4),s5 the present problem of an appointment of an out-of-state guardian would
26 This concise statement of the Corabi holding is found in McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d
867, 872 (Ord Cir. 1968).
27 Lang v. Elm City Constr. Co., 324 F.2d 235 (2d Cir.) aff'g per curiam 217 F. Supp.
873 (D. Conn. 1963); Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Co., 325 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.) aff'g per
curiam 217 F. Supp. 880 (D. Conn. 1963); DiStefano v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 258 F. Supp.
721 (E.D. Pa. 1966); In Re City of Bethlehem, 181 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Pa. 1960). Several
district court cases since Corabi have followed the rationale of that opinion without relying
specifically upon it. Berkowitz v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 317 F.2d 192 (3rd Cir.
1962) aff'g per curiam 217 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Pa. 1962) ; Ashley v. Read Constr. Co., 195 F.
Supp. 727 (D. Wyo. 1961); Meehan v. Central R1R. of New Jersey, 181 F. Supp. 594
(S.D.N.Y. 1960). For cases prior to Corabi but following the reasoning that it expressed, see
Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3rd Cir. 1955); Jaffe v. Philadelphia & Western R.R., 180
F.2d 1010 (3rd Cir. 1950); Johnstone v. O'Connor & Co., 164 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. Pa. 1958);
Morris v. Bradley, 139 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Pa. 1956). The Eighth Circuit has taken the
same position as that of the Third Circuit in Corabi. County of Todd v. Loegering, 297 F.2d
470 (8th Cir. 1961), aff'g 185 F. Supp. 134 (D. Minn. 1960); McCoy v. Blakely, 217 F.2d
227 (8th Cir. 1954); Curb and Gutter District No. 37 v. Parrish, 110 F.2d 902 (8th Cir.
1940). Contra, Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 172 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1949).
28 Even before the Corabi decision, the practice of appointing out-of-state representatives
to create diversity was strongly criticized. See Cohan & Tate, Manufacturing Federal Diversity
jurisdiction by the Appointment of Representatives: Its Legality and Propriety, 1 ViLL. L.
Rnv. 201 (1956).
29 This study is discussed in McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 871 (3rd Cir. 1968).
30 THE AmERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DmsION O JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (Part I) 175 & n.7 (1965) (Official Draft).
31 For further explanation of this apparent incongruence, see Comment, supra note 24, at
877-78 & nn.22-24 (1964).
32 THE AmERIcAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 30, at 7-46. For an assessment of the
ALl proposed legislation, see Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute,
36 U. CH. L. REv. 1 (1968); Marden, Reshaping Diversity jurisdiction: A Plea for Study by
the Bar, 54 A.B.A.J. 453 (1968).
33 Proposed Section 1301 (b) (4) reads:
An executor, or an administrator, or any person representing the estate of a
decedent or appointed pursuant to statute with authority to bring an action because
of the death of a decedent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the
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be directly solved. This section provides that the executor, administrator or
guardian would be treated as a citizen of the same state as the decedent or ward.
Another ALI proposed revision, section 1307, obviously is intended to replace
section 1359.1' As the ALI commentary relates,"8 there still exist differing factors
between the state and federal court structures 6 that-despite Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins'T-make forum shopping a reality. The purpose of the new section
1307 is to minimize the opportunities for maneuvering from one court to the
other.8 " The ultimate result in McSparran can be viewed as a judicial adoption
of the ALI proposed legislation even before such legislation has been effectuated
by Congress.
The McSparran majority might also have been impressed by the recently
expressed judicial discontent over Corabi's literal interpretation of section 1359.
As noted in Judge Thornberry's comment in Caribbean Mills, Inc. v. Kramer,9
the Third Circuit in deciding Corabi "defined 'improper or collusive' so that the
statute would have very narrow application, if any application at all .... By
focusing on the literal meanings of the two words, the court virtually emasculated
the statute ... ."" Furthermore, the majority in McSparran concluded that
the cases involving the appointment of an out-of-state representative do not
really fall within the accepted general purpose of diversity jurisdiction-preven-
decedent; and a guardian, committee, or other like representative of an infant or in-
competent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the person
represented. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 30, at 9.
34 Section 1307, entitled "Parties joined or made with a purpose of invoking or defeating
federal jurisdiction," reads as follows:
(a) A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any
party has been made or joined improperly, or collusively, or pursuant to agreement
or understanding between opposing parties, in order to invoke the jurisdiction of
such court.
(b) Whenever an object of a sale, assignment, or other transfer of the whole
or any part of any interest in a claim or any other property has been to enable or to
prevent the invoking of federal jurisdiction under this chapter or chapter 158 of this
title, jurisdiction of a civil action shall bc determined as if such sale, assignment or
other transfer had not occurred. The word "transfer" as used in this section includes
the appointment of a trustee, receiver, or other fiduciary, or any other person to hold
or receive interests of any kind, whether made by private persons or by a court or
any other official body. Id. at 21-22.
35 Id. at 100-01.
36 One such difference is in the size of verdicts. In Kaufmann Estate, 87 Pa. D. & C. 401
(Orphans' Ct. 1954), the appointment of an out-of-state guardian, which had up to that time
been refused by the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County except in special circumstances,
was permitted on the basis of the findings of Dean Benjamin F. Boyer of Temple University
School of Law. Dean Boyer was directed by a decree of the court
To conduct an investigation in order to determine whether there is, generally, a
wide disparity in the amounts of awards of damages in trespass between cases tried in
the Federal courts and those tried in the State courts sitting in Philadelphia .... Id.
at 403.
The results of Dean Boyer's study showed "that there is a better chance of obtaining and
sustaining a higher verdict in the Federal courts than in the State courts." Id. at 404.
37 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The primary reason that the Supreme Court in Erie Railroad
overruled the time-honored Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) was to abolish the
lack of uniformity in decisions within a state between the state and the federal court. The
application of different law by the federal and state courts within the same state made avail-
able federal forum shopping to the out-of-state litigant.
38 THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 30, at 100-01.
39 392 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1968).
40 Id. at 393.
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tion of prejudice to out-of-state litigants--because the controversy is "essentially
local.""'
The McSparran court's interpretation of section 1359 also took into con-
sideration the preliminary words of section 37 of the Judicial Code of 1911, even
though not a part of the present statute, on the ground that these words "give
content to its [section 1359's] otherwise indefinite and ambiguous words 'im-
properly or collusively'. 14 2 The court translated section 3741 to say in effect
"that a nominal party designated simply for the purpose of creating diversity of
citizenship, who has no real or substantial interest in the dispute or controversy,
is improperly or collusively named."44 This interpretation goes beyond the super-
ficial explanation in Corabi that there can be nothing collusive or improper in
openly going before a state court on a petition, which is a public record, to have
an out-of-state fiduciary appointed, whether it be for the purpose of obtaining
a larger judgment or of avoiding delay in the state courts. Rather, it recognizes
that the fraud involved is not upon the deciding judges or the defendant, but
upon the federal judicial structure. Diversity jurisdiction was created primarily
to combat a bias element in state litigations against out-of-staters.45 However, in
the Corabi-McSparran type of case, the controversy is dearly of a purely local
nature and continues'to remain so regardless of the appointment of an out-of-
state fiduciary. Thus, the potential for bias, so fundamental to the concept of
diversity, is completely lacking. In McSparran, the nominal or formal party-or,
in the words of the court, "the straw party"-was Stella McSparran, the out-of-
state guardian. The court concluded that as a guardian of only that money
which would be obtained as a result' of the tort claim, McSparran in fact
performed no real function except to contribute her citizenship for the mainte-
nance of the diversity action.4"
As another basis for concluding that the out-of-state fiduciary was merely a
"straw party," the McSparran majority attacked heretofore sacred ground by
looking to the intent and motive of the plaintiff.". The cases are legion that con-
firm the proposition that motive will not be investigated *when, considering the
jurisdiction of the court.48  Nevertheless, the McSparran court agreed with a
recent Vermont district court opinion49 and concluded that the wording of sec-
tion 1359 indicates that motive is a material ingredient in determining whether
the joining of a party to invoke federal jurisdiction is improper or collusive."
In the instant case no difficulty was encountered With the subjective element of
investigating the motives of the party since the "manufactured" diversity had
41 McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 876 (3rd Cir. 1968).
42 Id. at 873.
43 The pertinent provision of section 37 is quoted in the text accompanying note 12 supra.
44 McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 873 (3rd Cir. 1968).
45 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 23, at 64 (1963).
46 McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 873 (3rd Cir. 1968).
47 Id. at 874-75.
48 See, e.g., Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183, 189 (1931); Black and
White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co., 276 U.S.
518, 524 (1928); Dickerman v. Northern Trust Co., 176 U.S. 181, 191-92 (1900); McDonald
v. Smalley, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 620, 623-24 (1828).
49 Ferrara v. Philadelphia Laboratories, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Vt. 1967).
50 McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 874 (3rd Cir. 1968). ' I I
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been freely conceded by the parties.5 In future cases, however, such concessions
will be lacking, and it is conceivable that the investigation of subjective motive
may produce an uncertainty that will haunt many a district court.52 The majority
in McSparran distinguished Black and White Taxicab on its operative facts.5 "
However, the dissenting judges found it difficult to comprehend how the transfer
of a single asset by the operation of law to the guardian of the estate of a minor
was collusive in MciSparran, while the transfer of all the assets of one cQrpora-
tion to another by its Board of Directors was not considered collusive in Black
and White Taxicab.4
McSparran's breakthrough in attacking motive could have unparalleled
ramifications. For example, in the change of domicile situation, despite a party's
motive of creating diversity jurisdiction, if he actually moves into another state
with the intention of making it his home, his action is not considered fraudulent
and confers jurisdiction upon the federal court.55 The McSparran interpretation
of section 1359 may call for a reevaluation of this result, even though the Supreme
Court has endorsed the practice. An analogous problem is found in the area of
assignments. The rule to date is that "peppercorn" consideration will suffice to
render the assignment non-collusive for diversity purposes.56 Under McSparran
the motive behind the assignment, and not merely its legal effect, would be con-
trolling. Finally, it appears well-settled by such cases as Mecom v. Fitzsimmons
Drilling Co.5" that diversity can be intentionally destroyed by the appointment
of a fiduciary who is a citizen of the other party's state. By its apparent judicial
adoption of the proposed ALI legislation, which would prevent the intentional
creation and destruction of diversity jurisdiction, the McSparran court may have
opened the result in Mecom to reexamination.
The unarticulated goal of the majority in McSparran was the restriction of
diversity jurisdiction to controversies that involved a true out-of-state litigant,
so that the congestion on the federal dockets would be reduced. In itself this
purpose is laudable. However, the means by which it is achieved - examination
of subjective motivation - has traditionally been considered beyond the bound-
aries of judicial investigation in the area of federal diversity jurisdiction.
Thomas J. DeLuca
51 Id. at 876.
52 See Judge Biggs' dissent in Esposito v. Emery, 402 F.2d 878, 882-83 (3rd Cir. 1968).
53 McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 875 (3rd Cir. 1968).
54 Esposito v. Emery, 402 F.2d 878, 882 (3rd Cir. 1968).
55 See, e.g., Robertson v. Carson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 94, 106 (1873); Janzen v. Goos, 302
F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir. 1962).
56 City of Eufala v. Pappas, 213 F. Supp. 749 (M.D. Ala. 1963). In City of Eufala, a
conveyance of condemned land to an out-of-state citizen for consideration of one dollar was not
considered collusive under section 1359, even though several of the grantors testified in court
that "the reason for the transfer . . . was to create diversity and thus confer jurisdiction on
this court." Id. at 750.
57 284 U.S. 183 (1931).
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ADMIRALTY - LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION
ACT - LONGSHOREMEN'S ACT STATUS NOT SITus ORIENTED - ADMIRALTY
EXTENSION ACT OF 1948 IMPLIEDLY EXPANDED JURISDICTION OF LONGSHORE-
MEN'S ACT - INJURY ON DOCK EXTENDING OVER NAVIGABLE WATERS
Is WITHIN JURISDICTION OF LONGSHOREMEN'S ACT.-Marine Stevedoring Cor-
poration v. Oosting' [hereinafter referred to as Marine Stevedoring] is a consoli-
dation for appeal of three district court cases. In Johnson v. Traynor,2 plaintiff
Johnson and another longshoreman were working in a gondola car on a pier
when the ship's crane used in the loading operation went out of control. As a
result, Johnson was severely injured and the other man was killed. The Maryland
district court held that since the injuries were sustained on a dock, which is an
extension of the land, they did not occur "upon navigable waters" and were
therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers
Compensation Act3 [hereinafter referred to as the Longshoremen's Act].
In Marine Stevedoring Corporation v. Oosting,4 plaintiff's deceased hus-
band Vann was working on a pier over navigable waters. He was drowned when
a cable that he was lifting straightened and threw him into the river. The
Virginia district court held that the fatal injury occurred "upon navigable waters"
and, therefore, fell within the jurisdiction of the Longshoremen's Act.
The longshoreman in East v. Oosting,5 the third case consolidated for appeal,
was also injured on a pier. As in Johnson v. Traynor the ship's crane went out
of control and the load which it was lifting struck the plaintiff. The Virginia
federal district court held in this case that the Longshoremen's Act did not apply
because the injury had not been sustained "upon navigible waters."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in reversing
Johnson v. Traynor and East v. Oosting and affirming Marine Stevedoring
Corporation v. Oosting, held: (1) Since the Longshoremen's Act is status and
not situs oriented, it covers all longshoremen working under the same contract
regardless of where the injury occurred; (2) the Admiralty Extension Act,6
in extending the admiralty tort jurisdiction to cover injuries occurring on the
land which are caused by a vessel on navigable waters, impliedly extended cover-
age of the Longshoremen's Act to the same extent; and (3) an injury occurring
on a pier which extends over navigable waters is an injury occurring "upon
navigable waters" and thus within the coverage of the Longshoremen's Act;
-Marine Stevedoring Corporation v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968).
To understand the issues confronting the court in Marine Stevedoring, an
acquaintance with the events giving rise to the adoption of the Longshoremen's
Act is necessary. In 1914, Christen Jensen, a longshoreman, was fatally injured
while working on a gangway between a ship and a wharf. Jensen's widow was
awarded a claim against the employer, Southern Pacific Company, by the Work-
men's Compensation Commission of New York. The award was affirmed by
1 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968).
2 243 F. Supp. 184 (D. Md. 1965).
3 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§901-50 (1964).
4 238 F. Supp. 78 (E.D. Va. 1965)
5 245 F. Supp. 51 (ED. Va. 1965).
6 62 Stat. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).
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the New York Court of Appeals.' In 1917, the United States Supreme Court,
in the landmark decision of Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen," reversed the
state court decision, and held that state workmen's compensation laws were in-
applicable to injuries occurring within the federal maritime jurisdiction. 9 The
Court noted that, by virtue of article III, section 2 and article I, section 8 of
the Constitution, the power to fix and determine maritime law was vested in
Congress. The Court reasoned further that since Congress had not in fact acted,
the general maritime law as accepted by the federal courts constituted a "national
law" of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.°
Therefore, the court concluded, state legislation would be invalid
if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress or
works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general
maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of
that law in its international and interstate relations."
Within six months after the Jensen decision, Congress passed a federal
statute attempting to authorize the application of state workmen's compensation
laws to injuries occurring within the federal maritime jurisdiction.' The statute
was struck down by the Supreme Court as an improper delegation to the states
of the legislative powers of Congress.' A subsequent attempt by Congress to
authorize state compensation"' was likewise struck down in Washington v. W. C.
Dawson & Company.5 The Court, in its opinion in Dawson, suggested that
Congress pass a federal workmen's compensation statute. 6
Since, subsequent to Jensen, longshoremen injured on territory within the
federal maritime jurisdiction were not entitled to relief under state workmen's
compensation laws and no applicable federal workmen's compensation act had
yet been adopted, they were afforded relief only if it could be shown that the
injury occurred through the negligence of the employer. Perhaps realizing the
harsh effect of the Jensen decision upon longshoremen, the Court began to con-
jure exceptions to the rule. The "maritime but local" doctrine was developed,
under which state compensation and wrongful death acts could validly extend
to maritime activities which were of "local" as opposed to "national" concern.
The Court reasoned that the application of state law in such cases would "not
work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime
law, nor interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its
international and interstate relations."' 7 The second important exception was
created in Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Corporation"8 and expanded
7 Jensen v. Southern Pacific Co., 215 N.Y. 514, 109 N.E. 600 (1915).
8 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
9 Id. at 218.
10 Id. at 215.
11 Id. at 216.
12 Act of October 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395.
13 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920).
14 Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 216, 42 Stat. 634.
15 264 U.S. 219, 222-23 (1924).
16 Id. at 227.
17 Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921).
18 259 U.S. 263 (1922).
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by subsequent decisions." In those decisions, the Supreme Court made it clear
that state workmen's compensation laws were applicable to injuries occurring
on land or on docks, piers and similar structures permanently affixed to the shore,
but extending over navigable waters, which are considered extensions of the land.
The Court rationalized that the state compensation law was declared inapplicable
in Jensen because it would interfere with the already existing federal general
maritime law. However, since admiralty tort jurisdiction does not encompass
injuries occurring on land or extensions thereof, there is no federal law with which
the state law would conflict. Injuries on land or docks would therefore fall within
the jurisdiction of the local common law of torts, with the result that state
compensation statutes would supersede only state common law and not general
maritime law.2" Thus, while a longshoreman was within the broader maritime
contract jurisdiction by virture of the status of his employment, he was never-
theless within the domain of the state law if the situs of his injury occurred upon
the land or an extension thereof.
Congress finally realized that enactment 'of a federal statute was necessary
to provide coverage for longshoremen injured within the admiralty tort juris-
diction. The problem confronting Congress was the extent to which it should
exercise its admiralty jurisdiction authority in extending coverage. One alternative
was to extend coverage only to those injuries for which the states could not
constitutionally provide. The second alternative was to provide coverage which
would be co-extensive with the broader maritime contract jurisdiction, thus
basing recovery on the status of the employee rather than the situs of the injury.
Two considerations indicate that it was the intention of Congress to adopt the
first approach and thus leave as much coverage as possible with the states.
First, both past attempts of Congress had utilized this approach. Indeed, these
attempts had failed because the authority delegated to the states was so broad
that it was deemed unconstitutional.'
Second, an earlier version of the bill which eventually became the Long-
shoremen's Act had provided coverage for injuries "on a place within the ad-
miralty jurisdiction of the United States, except employment of local concern
and no direct relation to navigation or commerce."22 This language was thought
to exclude both the "maritime but local" and "extensions of the land" doctrines,
thus allowing those areas to remain exclusively within state coverage.2" However,
this version was later deleted for want of clarity.24 The relevant part of the bill
as finally passed reads as follows:
Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability
or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an
injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including
any dry dock) and if recovery for the disability or death through workmen's
19 See, e.g., Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1 (1946); T. Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276
U.S. 179 (1928). ,
20 See Industrial Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922).
21 See text accompanying notes 12-15 supra.
22 S. 3170, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1927).
23 See the discussion of the legislative history of the Longshoremen's Act in Calbeck v.




compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law.25
(Emphasis added.)
The issue in Marine Stevedoring as framed by Judge Sobeloff, author of the
majority opinion, was "whether an injury on a pier falls within the jurisdictional
provision 'upon the navigable waters,' and thus within the coverage of the Act."26
The court, using a three-pronged approach, answered this question in the af-
firmative.
The first approach was that the Longshoremen's Act was intended by Con-
gress to cover injuries to longshoremen by virtue of their employment, regardless
of the situs of the injury. The court pointed out that Congress constitutionally
could have grounded jurisdiction solely on the status of the employees - the
only question was whether Congress had so utilized its authority. As support
for its conclusion that Congress intended coverage to be based on status, the
court quoted from the opinion in the recent Supreme Court decision of Calbeck
v. Travelers Insurance Company.27 Referring to the Longshoremen's Act, the
Supreme Court had there stated that no room exists to doubt " 'that Congress
intended to exercise to the fullest extent all the power and jurisdiction it had
over the subject matter.' "28 The Court then concluded that "Congress intended
the compensation act to have a coverage co-extensive with the limits of its
authority."29 From this the Fourth Circuit in Marine Stevedoring reasoned that
coverage under the Longshoremen's Act was grounded on the broader admiralty
contract jurisdiction. Such interpretation, the court decided, would comply with
the Supreme Court's mandate in Voris v. Eikel 0 that the Act be liberally con-
strued. This mandate, the court continued, was reiterated in Reed v. The Yaka,3'
where the Supreme Court stated that the Act must be liberally construed to avoid
harsh and incongruous results. Judge Sobeloff stated his belief that since a long-
shoreman injured by a rotating crane while in the ship's hold would be covered
by the Act, it would be "harsh and incongruous to deny the same benefits to a
longshoreman injured while performing the same task on an adjoining pier."3 2
This very argument that the "navigable waters" concept should be expanded
in light of the Calbeck rationale to make coverage under the Act co-extensive
with the broader limits of admiralty contract jurisdiction was specifically re-
jected by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the case
of Houser v. O'Leary.33 There the court held that:
To read this language [the same language quoted from Calbeck in Oosting]
as applying to the problem before us is to read it out of context. Neither
Calbeck nor De Bardeleben was concerned with the meaning of the "nav-
25 Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927),
33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1964).
26 Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 900, 902 (4th Cir. 1968).
27 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
28 Id. at 130, quoting from De Bardeleben Coal Corp. v. Henderson, 142 F.2d 481, 483-84
(5th Cir. 1944).
29 Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 130 (1962).
30 346 U.S. 328, 333 (1953).
31 373 U.S. 410, 415 (1963).
32 Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 900, 907 (4th Cir. 1968).
33 383 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1967).
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igable water" requirement of § 903 (a). The problem in those cases was
how to construe the second requirement of § 903(a) : whether the Act
provided compensation for injuries sustained by employees on navigable
waters "whether or not a particular injury might also have been within the
constitutional reach of a state workmen's compensation law."3 4
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself in Calbeck implicitly accepted the validity of
applying the situs test to initially determine whether an employee is covered by
the Longshoremen's Act."5
Recognizing the Ninth Circuit's argument, the Marine Stevedoring court
attempted to answer it by pointing to Judge Palmieri's observation in the case of
Michigan Mutual Liability Company v. Arrien"8 that what was just as impor-
tant as the actual holding in Calbeck was the general approach to the Longshore-
men's Act taken by the Court. Judge Palmieri felt the Act is now to be viewed
as an affirmative exercise of admiralty jurisdiction. He stated that "it thus ap-
pears that 'upon navigable waters' is to be equated with 'admiralty jurisdic-
tion.' "" It should be pointed out that Judge Palmieri did not hold that the
plaintiff was covered by the Longshoremen's Act by virtue of his employment,
regardless of where the injury occurred. On the contrary, he based his finding
that the plaintiff was covered by the Act on the grounds that the injury occurred
"upon navigable waters" as that phrase was impliedly expanded by the Ad-
miralty Extension Act of 1948." Thus, in reaching its conclusion that the Long-
shoremen's Act was in fact status oriented, the court in Marine Stevedoring in
effect held that the statute had been unanimously interpreted incorrectly for the
past sixty-one years.
The second approach taken by the majority in Marine Stevedoring was
that the Admiralty Extension Act of 1948, in extending admiralty tort jurisdic-
tion to include all injuries caused by a vessel notwithstanding that such injury is
consummated on land, likewise impliedly expanded coverage of the Longshore-
men's Act.3 9 This argument was exhaustively explored in the lower court de-
cision of Johnson v. Traynor"0 [hereinafter referred to as Johnson] and rejected.
The thrust of the Johnson decision was that in order for such an argument to
prevail, it is necessary to be able to point to an actual amendment to the Long-
shoremen's Act. An amendment is required because it was clear to the Johnson
court that when the Longshoremen's Act was passed in 1927, Congress did not
intend to extend coverage to injuries occurring on the land or an extension there-
of. The Johnson court felt that the legislative history of both statutes, the express
language of the Extension Act, and administrative interpretations clearly negate
any impression that the Extension Act was capable of serving the purpose of
34 Id. at 731.
35 See Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 115-17, 119, 124-27 (1962).
36 233 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y., 1964), aff', 344 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1965).
37 Id. at 501.
38 Id. at 502.
39 Liability under the Admiralty Extension Act of 1948 is, of course, predicated on
negligence, whereas the Longshoremen's Act is basically a compensation statute, under which
recovery can be secured without regard to fault.
40 243 F. Supp. 184 (D. Md. 1965).
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providing the necessary amendment.41 The language of a 1958 House Report
adds further support to the Johnson position:
[The Longshoremen's Act] provides compensation for injuries suffered by
longshoremen . .. when they are working ... within the Federal maritime
jurisdiction on the navigable waters of the United States, including dry-
docks. These employees are subject to the protection of state safety stan-
dards when performing work on docks and in other shore areas.4 2
The Johnson court concluded that to construe the Admiralty Extension Act
as amending the Longshoremen's Act would be "the grossest type of judicial
legislation."4 Several courts confronted with this same argument have agreed
with the Johnson court that the Extension Act could not be construed as an
amendment.4 The court in Marine Stevedoring, however, refused to adopt the
Johnson view, but instead accepted the position taken by Judge Palmieri in
Michigan Mutual that in light of Calbeck,
the phrase "upon navigable waters" in this remedial legislation was not
limited to the tort jurisdiction as it was thought to have existed in 1927,
but must be construed to include the full range of the legislatively and
judically expanded concept of maritime jurisdiction.4 5
Thus, the passage of the Admiralty Extension Act impliedly expanded the juris-
diction of the Longshoremen's Act.
In its third approach, the Marine Stevedoring court reasoned that by virtue
of D'Aleman v. Pan American Airways," "the jurisdictional scope of the phrase
'upon navigable waters' extends to injuries occurring 'above' such waters."""
In D'Aleman, the alleged negligence had occurred on board a plane flying over
the high seas. The Second Circuit held that the cause of action was one in
admiralty and within the jurisdiction of the Federal Death on the High Seas
Act. It reasoned:
The purpose of the Act was to create a uniform cause of action where
none existed before and which arose beyond the territorial limits of the
United States or any State thereof.... The means of transportation into
the area is of no importance. 4" (Emphasis added.)
It would seem, therefore, that the reasoning utilized for extending the phrase "on
the high seas" to encompass a cause of action arising above the high seas for the
purpose of the Federal Death on the High Seas Act has no application for ex-
tending "upon navigable waters" to include injuries occurring on a dock above
41 Id. at 188.
42 H.R. REP. No. 2287, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1958).
43 243 F. Supp. at 192.
44 E.g., Houser v. O'Leary, 383 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1967); Atlantic Stevedoring Co. v.
O'Keefe, 220 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Ga. 1963), rev'd an other grounds, 354 F.2d 48 (5th Cir.
1965); Revel v. American Export Lines, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 279 '(E.D. Va. 1958); aff'd, 266
F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1959).
45 398 F.2d at 906.
46 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958).
47 Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 900, 908 (4th Cir. 1968).
48 259 F.2d at 495.
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navigable waters for the purpose of the Longshoremen's Act. In the latter situa-
tion the cause of action is presently within the jurisdiction of the state courts.
Furthermore, as Chief Judge Haynsworth points out in his dissenting opinion,
such a view taken by the majority "flies in the face" of the well-settled doctrine
that a dock is an extension of the land."9 Also, the majority's position in Marine
Stevedoring is completely opposite to that taken by the same court nine years
earlier in American Export Lines Incorporated v. Reve ° In that case Judge
Sobeloff, writing for the majority, stated:
Since Revel was injured while standing on the dock, (an extension
of the land) his remedies are restricted to those afforded by the local law....
This is true even though Congress has embraced such cases within the
maritime jurisdiction of the United States. Extension of Admiralty Act,
46 U. S. C. A. § 740.,'
This position was reiterated by the same court in a 1965 case involving admiralty
tort jurisdiction, in which Revel was cited with approval.52 In the present case,
the majority dismissed Revel by stating in a footnote that it was of the view that
Revel had been overruled by Calbeck.
The court's assertions that the Longshoremen's Act is status and not situs
oriented, and that an injury sustained on a dock or pier occurs "upon navigable
waters," seem to be wholly unsubstantiated by sound judicial precedent. In the
sixty-one years that the Longshoremen's Act has been in effect, every court which
has considered these two arguments has rejected them.5 On the other hand, the
position that the jurisdiction of the Longshoremen's Act was extended by the Ad-
miralty Extension Act has found acceptance in a few other courts."5 However, the
majority of the courts faced with this argument have also rejected it."5
One author, in commenting on the current judicial trend toward the land-
ward extension of the coverage of the Longshoremen's Act, has offered two pos-
sible explanations for such expansion.' These reasons may have been the prime
movers in the Fourth Circuit's decision in Marine Stevedoring. They are:
First, the courts may have simply recognized that a navigable-watersjurisdictional requirement in a workmen's compensation law ostensibly de-
signed to afford relief to employees whose duties require them to divide
their time between activities on land and on water is both illogical and
impractical. . . . Second, and probably more important, the courts are
49 Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 900, 912-13 (4th Cir. 1968) (dissent-
ing opinion).
50 266 F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1959).
51 Id. at 84.
52 Hastings v. Mann, 340 F.2d 910, 91 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 963 (1965).
53 Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 900, 906n.11 (4th Cir. 1968).
54 As to rejection of status argument see, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Shue, 382 F.2d 344,
346 (1967) ; as to rejection of the argument that an injury sustained on a dock extending over
navigable waters occurs "upon navigable waters," see generally, Johnson v. Traynor, 243 F.
Supp. 184, 187-88 (D. Md. 1965).
55 See, e.g., Interlake S.S. Co. v. Nielsen, 338 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1964); Michigan Mutual
Liability Co. v. Arrien, 233 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd on other grounds, 344 F.2d
640 (2d Cir. 1965).
56 These cases are collected at Comment, 18 HAsTiNos L.J. 891, 923 (1967).
57 Comment, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1553, 1563 (1966).
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doubtless aware that Longshoremen's Act compensation awards can be more
generous than the recoveries available under state legislation for comparable
injuries.5 8
While the ends ultimately attained by the Marine Stevedoring decision are
more desirable from a humanitarian viewpoint, the means utilized still amount
to "the grossest type of judicial legislation." Judging from the finn positions taken
by the various circuits on the issue of extending coverage of the Longshoremen's
Act to injuries on a dock, it seems obvious that the courts will remain divided
on this point. The Supreme Court has not ruled on this precise issue in recent
years. However, judicial legislation or not, in light of its recent trend to inter-
pret away provisions of the Act to provide a broader federal coverage to long-
shoremen," the Supreme Court may well accept one of the three approaches
offered in the Marine Stevedoring opinion. The avenue of least resistance, in
terms of judicial precedent, would be acceptance of the position that the Ad-




59 See, e.g., Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963); Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370
U.S. 114 (1962).
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